Musical and cultural events as a resource of "soft power" in Russia's foreign policy (2022–2026)

The subject of the study is the political function of state-organized music and cultural events as a resource of "soft power" in the foreign policy of the Russian Federation in 2022-2026, in the context of the closure of Western institutional channels of cultural diplomacy. Three types of events are analyzed, differentiated by their mechanism of action: a mega-event competition ("Intervision-2025"), the touring diplomacy of state theaters (Mariinsky and Bolshoi theaters in China, "Russian Seasons" in Oman and Bahrain), and a professional performance competition (the International Competition named after P. I. Tchaikovsky after its exclusion from the World Federation of International Music Competitions). The state nature of the organization – an institution established by presidential decree, funded by the federal budget – removes the problem of attributing the event to a specific actor. The empirical base consists of doctrinal documents, regulatory acts on the establishment and funding of competitions, a timeline of events from 2022 to 2026, official foreign policy discourse, and foreign media reception. The subject scope excludes domestic political functions of the events, sports mega-events, and commercial music exports. The methodological framework includes qualitative case studies with three embedded units of analysis, categorical analysis of doctrinal documents from 2022 to 2025, event analysis, and comparative analysis of official discourse and foreign media reception. The scientific novelty is linked to the fact that no political science papers on "Intervision-2025" have been identified in Russian peer-reviewed journals, and state-organized musical events are conceptualized as an independent resource type of "soft power." A functionally justified concept of touring diplomacy is introduced – the systematic use of international tours by state performing groups as a signal of intergovernmental rapprochement. It is concluded that such events have a reactive-institutional function: they provide a demonstration of international subjectivity and create an alternative value framework addressed to the "global majority." Three formats implement this function through different mechanisms: the mega-event competition establishes its own institution in place of the closed one, touring diplomacy converts accumulated performance capital into signals of intergovernmental rapprochement, and the professional competition retains a reputational institution outside the international federation. The stated coverage indicators are fundamentally unverifiable, which shifts the object of analysis from the unobservable effect of attractiveness to the observable infrastructure of its production: norms, budgets, formats, and rhetoric.