Judicial Intervention in Commercial Arbitration in Uganda: Balancing Court Supervision and Party Autonomy

Commercial arbitration rests on party autonomy, the freedom of parties to resolve their disputes before a tribunal of their choosing rather than the courts, yet it cannot function wholly apart from the courts, which support the process and supervise its product. The relationship between the two is governed in Uganda by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, whose section 9 commands that no court shall intervene except where the Act so provides. This article examines judicial intervention in commercial arbitration in Uganda and the balance it strikes between court supervision and party autonomy. It sets out the conceptual foundations of autonomy and intervention and the international framework in the UNCITRAL Model Law and the New York Convention; it analyses the Ugandan statutory scheme and the constitutional and institutional setting; and it examines, through a substantial body of case law, judicial intervention at the pre-award stage, through the stay of court proceedings, competence-competence and separability, and at the post-award stage, through the setting aside, recognition and enforcement of awards and the publicpolicy ground. Drawing on decisions including National Social Security Fund v Alcon International, Babcon v Mbale Resort Hotel, Hwan Sung Industries v Tajdin Hussein, Uganda Telecom v Hi-Tech Telecom, Lakeside Dairy, Great Lakes Energy, Aya Investments and the recent Commercial Court jurisprudence, and on comparative authority from England and Kenya, the article argues that Ugandan law has settled firmly on a policy of minimal intervention, but that uncertainty remains over rights of appeal and the scope of public policy. It recommends that the primacy of section 9 be preserved and clarified, that the appeal question be settled by legislation, and that the arbitral institutions and the specialised commercial judiciary be strengthened.