Evolutionary game analysis of corporate green technology innovation strategies under the “dual carbon” goals

Green technology innovation (GTI) serves as an important driving force for promoting enterprises’ high-quality development and achieving the “Dual Carbon” strategic goals of carbon peaking and carbon neutrality. Enterprises’ motivation to pursue GTI is jointly shaped by government regulatory measures—namely, subsidies, oversight, and penalties—and consumers’ green consumption behavior. Based on a systematic analysis of the strategic relationships among the government, enterprises, and consumers during the corporate GTI process, this study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model to reveal the evolutionary patterns of strategic interactions among these stakeholders under government regulation. Furthermore, MATLAB is used to simulate the evolutionary trajectories of the three parties and analyze the factors influencing their strategy evolution. The findings indicate the following: (1) an appropriate level of government oversight encourages enterprises to proactively pursue GTI, whereas excessive oversight inhibits their technological R&D activities; (2) the intensity of government subsidies is positively correlated with enterprises’ motivation to engage in GTI; and (3) increasing the penalties imposed on enterprises accelerates the system’s convergence toward a stable state to varying degrees. Notably, changes in penalty intensity have a negligible effect on consumers but a significant effect on enterprises.