How Does Government Innovation Regulation Inhibit Corporate “Greenwashing”?—Based on a Tripartite Evolutionary Game Perspective

A strategic fulcrum for leading high-quality economic development and shaping the nation’s future. Core competitiveness lies in how governments can effectively stimulate consumer demand for green consumption and motivate enterprises to pursue green technology innovation through the development of precise and efficient innovative regulation models. In this paper, a tripartite evolutionary game model is constructed based on evolutionary game theory, encompassing the government, enterprises, and consumers. We analyze the strategic interactions and evolutionary path among these three entities under conditions of bounded rationality and information asymmetry. The research reveals the following: (1) the government can effectively guide enterprises towards genuine green innovation through enhanced rewards for substantive innovation and increased penalties for strategic innovation; (2) consumer purchasing decisions are significantly shaped by economic benefits, perceived social value, and government subsidies, with their market choices forming a critical external supervisory force; and (3) government regulatory strategies are dynamically adjusted in response to market integrity levels and social welfare, with a tendency to implement innovative regulation when “greenwashing” risk is elevated. In conclusion, simulation analysis is conducted using MATLAB 2018a, and governance recommendations are offered based on three dimensions: precise government regulation, enhanced corporate responsibility, and enhanced consumer capabilities. These recommendations offer both a theoretical basis and a practical path for establishing an integrated green innovation governance system based on incentive constraint empowerment.