Collective intentionality in international relations: a reductionist view

The concept of collective intentionality has come to play an increasingly prominent role in the theoretical study of international relations (IR). In particular, scholars regularly treat two kinds of collectives – states and groups of states – as forming intentions and engaging in the joint pursuit of shared goals. In this piece, we intervene in the burgeoning IR debate on the ontology underlying this practice by making the case for a reductionist view of state intentions and joint interstate action. Drawing on Michael Bratman’s work on social ontology and original supporting arguments, we develop a sophisticated, non-summative reductionist account which overcomes many of the theoretical concerns that previously led scholars to reject reductionism as a viable ontological view within IR. Our account promises to advance both the empirical and normative study of international politics in several ways: it entails guidelines on how to study the origins of foreign policies and grand strategies; it lays the groundwork for novel views on interstate cooperation as it takes place in formats such as coalitions of the willing or security concerts; and it provides a promising framework for assessing collective moral responsibility and its relation to individual responsibility.