This article analyses multiparty presidentialism and democratic challenges in Indonesia and the Philippines. Both countries adopt presidential government and competitive multiparty elections, yet their political practices reveal different patterns of coalition formation, executive-legislative relations, opposition capacity, and elite domination. The central problem is how multiparty presidentialism shapes democratic accountability and government stability in two Southeast Asian democracies. This study aims to compare presidential institutions, party systems, coalition practices, and contemporary democratic challenges in Indonesia and the Philippines. It applies a qualitative descriptive method with a comparative approach. Data were collected through literature review of journal articles, books, constitutional documents, democracy reports, corruption indicators, and credible news sources. The findings show that Indonesia’s presidentialism is marked by oversized coalitions, pragmatic party bargaining, weak opposition, political dynasties, corruption, and shrinking civic oversight. The Philippines shows more personalistic coalition politics, weak party institutionalization, entrenched dynasties, patronage, vote buying, disinformation, and elite conflict. The comparison indicates that constitutional design alone does not determine democratic quality. Party institutionalization, coalition incentives, political culture, corruption control, civil liberties, and checks and balances are decisive in shaping the performance of multiparty presidentialism. It affirms the need to examine formal institutions together with everyday political practice in comparative politics.
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Febriyanti et al. (2026) studied this question.
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