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We analyze a model of overlapping generations with a fixed factor (‘land’), malleable capital, and labor. We consider the dynamic effects of various fiscal policies including taxes on rent, wages, and creation of public debt on capital accumulation, land prices, and intergenerational welfare. Minimal assumptions (uniqueness and stability) imply that a land tax may initially raise land values, but the upper bound is less than one-half of the tax revenues. Assuming homothetic utility, the ratio between the long-run capital responses to a land tax and to a lump-sum transfer of equivalent revenue from the young to the old depends solely on the share of labor.
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CHAMLEY et al. (1987) studied this question.
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