In the post 9/11 era, the United States pioneered initiatives like the Five Eyes Alliance (FVEY), involving the United States (US), United Kingdom (UK), Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, to enhance intelligence collaboration. In Africa, complex terrorist threats have undermined intelligence operations, with regions like West Africa, the Sahel, and North Africa grappling with violent extremist groups. Devastating attacks such as Westgate Mall in 2013 and the one at Garissa University in 2015, are some of the main terror attacks in Kenya. Although, Kenya and the United Kingdom have established longstanding security and intelligence cooperation, Al-Shabaab threats and operational challenges persist thus raising questions regarding the effectiveness of existing intelligence-sharing mechanism. This study examined intelligence sharing mechanisms between Kenya and UK in countering Al-Shabaab threats in Nairobi County, Kenya. The study was guided by three theories namely, Smart Power Theory, Mosaic Theory and Securitization Theory. The study adopted a descriptive research design which integrated quantitative and qualitative approaches to obtained detailed understanding of Kenya-UK intelligence-sharing practices. The study was conducted in Nairobi County and focused on institutions and actors involved in intelligence sharing and counterterrorism efforts. The target population was 350 out of which a sample size of 200 was picked. In addition, Key Informant Interviews [KIIs] were selected from policy experts and political decision-makers, officials from the UK High Commission, corporate security experts, as well as returnees and defectors from Al-Shabaab. The study used both purposive, census and snowballing sampling techniques. Both primary and secondary data collection methods were used. Questionnaire was the principal instrument supported by interview schedules. Data was analysed using descriptive statistics by way of cross-tabulations, bar graphs and pie-charts together with themes developed from KIIs. The findings indicate particularly strong support for joint task forces, with 83.5% of Kenyan respondents and 83.0% of UK respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing that they are effective intelligence-sharing mechanisms. Overall, the study concludes that effectiveness of intelligence sharing mechanisms does not depend on any single mechanism but by the interaction of formal agreements, joint operational structure, technological capabilities and human capacity. Therefore, the study recommends that both countries should invest more on technology acquisition, interoperability. This will ensure continuous evaluation of intelligence-sharing mechanisms to determine whether they remain responsive to the changing nature of Al-Shabaab threats.
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Mbae et al. (2026) studied this question.
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