The semiconductor supply chains and artificial intelligence increasingly influence the allocation of economic and strategic power. This paper will look at the effects of their interaction on competition between the United States and China. A qualitative comparative case study uses a combination of documentary analysis, systematic comparisons, and tracing of the processes of the selected policy developments between 2018 and 2025. There are similar observations in descriptive statistics up to 2024 with a historical window of 2014-2023 on patents. The analysis differentiates between technological ability, reliance on supply, and governmental control of access. The global semiconductor sales went up to US$627.6 billion in 2024, but with significant downturns and upswings. American strengths in reported investment in private artificial intelligence and significant model production are matched with the Chinese prowess in the number of artificial intelligence patents. As it is evidenced through corporations, high manufacturing capacity and equipment continue to be internationally dispersed. The results can be interpreted to suggest the existence of selective technology fragmentation but not the total separation. The impact of export restrictions is that cost of acquiring important capabilities may be raised, although they spur substitution, organisational adaptation, and alternative systems of infrastructure. Geo political power thus is rested on a joint management of complementary resources, believable alliances as well as enduring domestic innovation. The paper concludes that diversified supply networks and effective international collaboration should be complemented with specific security protection measures.
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Rajib Chandra Modok (2026) studied this question.
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