This article examines geoeconomic fragmentation — the realignment of trade, finance, and investment along geopolitical lines — and the rise of national economic security as the main justification for it. Drawing on IMF, WTO, WEF, and IEA data through 2026, it shows that fragmentation is already measurable: trade between rival blocs grows 4–6% more slowly than trade within them, the dollar's share of reserves has fallen to about 57%, and current restrictions cost the world an estimated $213–307 billion a year. The article analyses three channels — tariffs and friend-shoring in trade, sanctions and reserve diversification in finance, and export controls in strategic sectors such as semiconductors and critical minerals — and weighs their security benefits against costs that could reach 6–7% of global GDP in severe scenarios. It argues that emerging economies outside the major blocs, including Uzbekistan and Central Asia, face the largest losses but can gain as connector economies through routes such as the Middle Corridor. The conclusion is that fragmentation should be managed rather than reversed: security measures should stay narrow, financial plumbing should remain interoperable, and resilience should come from diversification rather than isolation.
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Nodirbek Abdivaxobov (2026) studied this question.
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