An Analysis of Position-Taking and Position-Avoidance in the U.S. House of Representatives

Scholars of legislative politics have extensively explored the political factors that incentivize members of Congress to engage in position-taking. This has led to a well-developed body of work focusing on why legislators skip congressional roll-call votes. Current scholarship offers mixed conclusions on whether electoral considerations influence a representative’s likelihood of abstaining from a roll-call vote. To help clarify these mixed findings, we analyze a broader range of electoral forces. In this study, we examine all roll-call abstentions among members serving in the U.S. House of Representatives from the 85th to the 117th Congress. We find that electoral considerations can indeed impact abstention behavior; however, the effect depends on the type of election. Specifically, lawmakers vulnerable in their primary race are more likely to avoid taking a position on a roll-call vote, whereas electoral vulnerability in the general election appears to have little effect. These findings deepen our understanding of how elections influence representation.