Deliberation or Efficiency? Examining the Relationship Between Primary Election Rules and Legislative Effectiveness in the US House, 1990–2020

To date, limited research has explored the correlation between electoral institutions and their impact on legislators' capacity and willingness to engage in the difficult task of legislating. I aim to fill this void by investigating how various primary election rules influence legislative effectiveness within the US House from 1990 to 2020. My analysis reveals that members elected through closed primary processes tend to have higher average legislative effectiveness scores (LES). However, this effect is contingent upon the competitiveness of the district and is primarily driven by increased bill introduction and committee activity, rather than the successful passage of legislation in the chamber or the legislative process as a whole. These findings underscore a potential tradeoff between a deliberative and efficient government and carry significant implications for reform efforts, representation, and governance. Related Articles Lewallen, Jonathan. 2024. “Views on the Hill: Disagreement and Effectiveness in U.S. Senate Agenda Setting.” Politics & Policy 52, no. 2: 306–330. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12583 . Sohn, Hyodong. 2023. “Policy Agenda Trade‐offs for Sustainability: The Compositional Change of Attention about Energy in Legislative Hearings.” Politics and Policy 51, no. 6: 973–1007. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12563 . Steger, Wayne P. 2008. “The President's Legislative Program: An Issue of Sincere versus Strategic Behavior.” Politics & Policy 33, no. 2: 312–329. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2005.tb00645.x .