Productivity matters: legislative effectiveness, bipartisanship, and electoral accountability

Surveys show that U.S. voters detest Congressional gridlock and desire greater legislative productivity. However, incumbents are rarely voted out. I argue that this lack of electoral accountability is driven in part by an information lacuna as to what extent individual representatives are working to move legislation forward. Through a series of survey experiments, I find that respondents reduce support for representatives when given information directly highlighting their lack of effectiveness in moving bills through the legislative process. They also reduce support for legislators less willing to engage in bipartisan lawmaking. These finding hold regardless of the strength of one's partisan attachment as well as whether the legislator is a member of the inparty or outparty. I also find that respondents reward members of Congress that have a demonstrated record of effective and bipartisan lawmaking, albeit to a lesser degree. The results suggest that if media, interest groups, or other institutions provide more information concerning individual representatives' role in the legislative process, the electorate can hold them accountable for their productivity.