Presidential Immunity under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

Presidential immunity protects the effective performance of public office, but its operation depends on the court, the applicable law and the legal basis of jurisdiction. This article examines the relationship between domestic presidential immunity, customary international law and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, with particular reference to Uganda. It adopts doctrinal and comparative methods, examining constitutional provisions, treaty rules, judicial decisions and scholarly commentary. The analysis distinguishes immunity before foreign national courts from immunity before international criminal tribunals and separates the Court's jurisdiction from states' obligations to arrest and surrender suspects. It finds that article 27 excludes official capacity as a bar to the Court's jurisdiction, while article 98 addresses potentially conflicting cooperation obligations. Their relationship is particularly contested where an incumbent represents a state that has not joined the Rome Statute. The article evaluates the Arrest Warrant, Taylor, Al- Bashir, Kenyatta, Mongolia and Trump decisions without treating their different legal settings as interchangeable. It also identifies Kenya's express constitutional exception for treaty crimes and the limited institutional reach of the Malabo Protocol's immunity clause. The article concludes that constitutional continuity and international accountability require clearer domestic cooperation procedures, reasoned treatment of third-state immunities and effective safeguards for accused persons. A general postponement of all ICC proceedings against serving presidents would require legal reform; it cannot accurately be presented as the existing Rome Statute rule.