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The relevance of the study stems from the absence in the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offenses of a provision on suspension or interruption of time limits for enforcing decisions during martial law. Meanwhile, the Law of Ukraine “On Enforcement Proceedings” contains such a provision, resulting in conflicting interpretations of time limits. The purpose of the article is to clarify the relationship between the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offenses and the Law of Ukraine “On Enforcement Proceedings” concerning time limits for enforcing decisions in administrative offense cases under martial law, analyze the Supreme Court’s case law, and generalize its approach. The study applies formal-legal, systemic, comparative legal methods, and a method based on applying European Court of Human Rights case law to national normative material. Articles 300 and 303 of the Code, the Law provision, and case law from 2023–2025 were analyzed. The study establishes that the conflict has a normative origin. Interruption of time limits is not provided in the Code but is derived indirectly through a referral provision. This resulted in divergent interpretations by courts of different instances, subsequently eliminated through a Supreme Court position. Comparison with Portugal, where suspension of time limits for administrative proceedings is regulated by a provision, demonstrated that the conflict is not inevitable. The article proposes supplementing the Code with a provision on interruption of the time limit for submitting a decision for enforcement during martial law. Further research should address such amendment’s wording and extension to other procedural time limits.
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Olha Ya. Kovalchuk (2026) studied this question.
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