India’s foreign policy in the mid-2020s is often described as a return to non-alignment, yet the label obscures as much as it reveals. This paper examines how India has managed the intensifying rivalry between the United States and China between 2020 and October 2026 by refusing a formal choice while making many small, consequential ones. Using a qualitative, document-based design and official trade statistics, the study applies the concepts of strategic autonomy, hedging, and issue-based alignment to four arenas: trade and tariffs, defence and technology cooperation, energy, and multilateral diplomacy. The evidence shows a pattern of asymmetric diversification. India deepened defence ties with Washington through a ten-year framework while absorbing a sharp tariff shock; it stabilised relations with Beijing after the 2020 border crisis while its trade deficit with China widened to about US$112 billion; and it increased reliance on Russian crude to a record share of imports during the 2026 Gulf crisis. The paper argues that India’s “choosing without choosing” is less an ideology than a risk-management practice, constrained by manufacturing dependence on China and by the unpredictability of American trade policy. It concludes that strategic autonomy has become costlier, and that its sustainability depends on domestic industrial capacity.
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K. Manjulamma, MA, PhD (2026) studied this question.
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