Anthropotechnics and transcendental phenomenology

This paper discusses the possibility of interpreting Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology through the lens of Sloterdijk’s concept of anthropotechnics. The analysis accentuates the parallels between Husserl’s phenomenology and Sloterdijk’s anthropotechnical approach, particularly the significance of the ethical and transformational nature of philosophy in both conceptions. In the first section, emphasis is placed on Sloterdijk’s anthropotechnical interpretation of transcendental phenomenology, according to which phenomenology is an ambiguous stance. For Sloterdijk, the early period of Husserl’s thought can be seen as a re­‐establishment of the significance of the unworldly, contemplative mode of living. Conversely, the late period of phenomenology represents an attempt to ground the transcendental subject in the world. The paper argues that, in contrast to Sloterdijk’s perspective, the original transformational dimension of the transcendental reduction cannot be restricted to the isolating subject in an inner enclave, but rather has to encompass the entire domain of human reason and culture. The second section discusses Husserl’s conception of philosophical reduction in the anthropotechnical perspective. It is argued that according to Husserl — both in his early and late works — the phenomenological transformation is characterised by the philosopher’s radical responsibility for humanity. The aforementioned ambiguity of Husserl’s phenomenology is thus not the sign of a shift between early and late periods of his thought. It is rather the structural characteristic inherent in both the phenomenological investigation and the philosophising subject itself. The article highlights the possibility, one not without challenges, of an anthropotechnical interpretation of phenomenology.