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Starting from a jar of jam that is “about to go public,” this essay examines the epistemology behind definitions of language models: how we come to know an object, why we select certain properties as explanations, and where we conflate mechanisms of formation, category identity, performance evaluation, and institutional recognition. American disputes over jam regulation do not provide legal backing that proves Zeji-LM correct; rather, they raise a set of independently examinable questions: What does a name constrain? On what grounds does a standard stand? How does a producer's declaration become a verifiable judgment? This essay argues that computational mechanisms can provide rigorous and valid mathematical definitions, but cross-disciplinary explanation and public discussion must also state the object being modeled, the scope of application, and the boundaries of the evidence. Zeji-LM's significance lies first in a procedural proposal: to give training selection an ex ante basis and traceable records, and to test separately what was transmitted and what the model actually retained. The essay does not claim that selecting training data necessarily reduces hallucinations, nor does it infer model consciousness from anthropomorphic output. Humor opens the questions; evidence decides which statements may remain.
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Chen et al. (2026) studied this question.
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