Who Holds the President to Account? Rethinking Constitutional Reform and Presidential Removal Through Ius Constituendum

The presidential system in Indonesia has consolidated executive power in the President; however, in the post-reform era, there remain normative discrepancies within the structure of checks and balances. The absence of a comprehensive law on the presidential institution creates loopholes for the abuse of power and undermines the principles of a democratic rule of law. This study aims to formulate an ideal design for a Presidential Institutions Act that can strengthen accountability, transparency, and oversight effectiveness. The method employed is normative legal research using a legislative and conceptual approach. Data were obtained through a literature review of legislation, constitutional law, and relevant doctrine, and were subsequently analysed qualitatively. The research findings indicate that the current presidential framework is inadequate, as it remains fragmented and subordinate. An ideal formulation requires limiting the President's discretion through clear procedural, substantive, and temporal provisions to prevent unilateral expansion of power. Furthermore, transparency in the regulation of presidential facilities and powers is key to minimising moral hazard and strengthening public control mechanisms. The integration of accountability and transparency principles has proven essential to maintaining a balance between the effectiveness of leadership and the rule of law. In conclusion, the enactment of a comprehensive Presidential Institutions Act is an urgent necessity to close normative gaps, strengthen checks and balances, and ensure the sustainability of Indonesia's constitutional democracy.