Coordination Traps and Behavioral Interventions: Stated Willingness-to-Change Mandatory Pension Fund Category

Drawing on political economy and behavioural economics, this paper models fund category choices as a coordination game in which cognitive biases – status quo dependence, default reliance, and decision inertia – trap individuals in Pareto-dominated equilibria. Using primary survey data from a non-representative online convenience sample of 259 employed Croatian citizens and an embedded randomised experiment (N = 206), the study examines three nudging interventions: social norms, framing effects, and framing combined with loss aversion. An ordinal regression model adjusted for baseline willingness shows no statistically significant differences between the three nudge conditions and the control group in stated willingness to change (all p > .48). Point estimates are positive and increase with intervention intensity. The paper contributes to the literature by linking coordination traps to behavioural intervention design and documenting the absence of statistically significant effects of the tested interventions on stated willingness to change in the observed sample.