Anchors as weapons: Chinese maritime grey-zone operations and the limits of Chinese influence typologies

Existing typologies of Chinese influence in Europe organise activities into four categories: economic leverage, elite capture, information manipulation, and critical infrastructure positioning. This paper argues that Baltic Sea cable incidents since 2023 require a fifth-physical grey-zone operations-that existing frameworks cannot capture. Drawing on structured focused comparison of the Newnew Polar Bear (2023) and Yi Peng 3 (2024) cases, supplemented by comparison with Taiwan cable disruptions, the paper shows that Chinese-linked vessels deployed anchor-dragging combining deliberate infrastructure damage, commercial proxy instrumentalisation, and systematic deniability architecture exploiting flag-state jurisdiction. Process tracing finds the cumulative evidence substantially more consistent with deliberate disruption than accident. The paper further identifies an emergent Russia-China nexus that single-actor frameworks cannot address, and develops policy implications across four domains: jurisdictional reform, intelligence and attribution, deterrence, and diplomatic engagement with Beijing. The analysis contributes a revised typology and actionable framework for European policymakers.