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Ransomware defences usually treat detection and backup as separate systems: detectors raise alerts while backups run on fixed schedules, regardless of the current threat. This paper presents RansomShield, a proof-of-concept architecture in which a continuous threat score from a multi-modal detector directly governs backup frequency, snapshot immutability and isolation. The detector combines four signals accounting for a random forest on memory-forensic features, a rule-based API-call sequence scorer, a storage I/O anomaly analyser, and a file-type-aware Shannon entropy monitor. Their outputs are fused by confidence-weighted averaging with exponential smoothing. A four-level controller with hysteresis maps the smoothed score to a backup policy. The components were built using CIC-MalMem-2022, RanSMAP, NapierOne and the Mendeley Ransomware/Benignware System Calls dataset. On CIC-MalMem-2022, the memory detector achieved a cross-validated F1 score of 0.9999 ± 0.0002 for binary classification and 76.07% accuracy for 16-class classification. In simulated attacks modelled on seven ransomware families, all seven were detected after a mean of 13.4 file-system events and escalated to immutable, air-gapped snapshots at 30-second intervals, while a benign scenario produced a 5.6% event-level false-positive rate.
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OLOJA et al. (2026) studied this question.
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