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Does India's Minimum Support Price (MSP) for wheat act as an institutional price floor, enforced mechanically by government procurement, or as a behavioral reference point that shapes pricing on its own? Using 6,231 daily state-level wheat price records from five Indian states over 2019–2023 and a Saez/Chetty-style bunching estimator with a bootstrapped confidence interval, I find prices cluster at MSP far more than a smooth counterfactual predicts (normalized excess mass b = 6.35, 95% CI [4.77, 8.18]), with 61.8% of observations at or above MSP against 38.2% below. Bunching does not scale cleanly with procurement intensity across states. A sharp point mass exactly at MSP tracks procurement intensity closely (r = +0.88), while a broader hump of excess mass around MSP does not (r = −0.08), suggesting a mechanical floor layered on a behavioral anchor. Corroborating timing evidence for that anchor comes from the 2020-21 farm-law episode. Excess mass turned significantly negative (b = −5.15) and at/above-MSP pricing collapsed from 64.1% to 5.4%, then rebounded past its starting level after repeal. The year 2020–21 is the only year in five that fails to recover from its usual seasonal trough. Because the window overlaps with COVID-19's worst period in India, and a later global wheat-price run-up followed, the evidence is suggestive, not conclusive. The decisive result is that the two mechanisms are separable, not competing, and the behavioral component moves with confidence in government price support.
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Myra Jhawar (2026) studied this question.
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