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In a balanced random stable-marriage market, one fixed woman manipulates men-proposing deferred acceptance to obtain her best attainable partner. We prove that the women's expected average true partner rank is asymptotic to (ln n)², improving the previous O((ln n)⁴) bound, while the men's is asymptotic to n/(2ln n). The men's and women's average ranks, normalized by n/ln n and ln n, converge jointly in distribution to (U,U⁻¹), where U is uniform on $(0,1)$. Under optimal truthful truncation, the span of women's average ranks within the reported stable core, divided by ln n, converges in distribution to U⁻¹-1.
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Ron Kupfer (2026) studied this question.
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