Military effectiveness and small states: Vietnam in the South China Sea

Much of the scholarship on military effectiveness focuses on major powers and land warfare, leaving naval domains and small states underexplored. Debates on the impact of technological change also tend to overlook how non-Western small states adapt in asymmetric settings. This article fills these gaps by examining Vietnam’s approach to asymmetric maritime conflict in the South China Sea. It argues that Vietnam’s tactical approach reflects Stephen Biddle’s “modern system” principles – cover and concealment, dispersion, and combined arms – while embedding them within its enduring doctrine of people’s war. With the rise of artificial intelligence, autonomous technologies, Vietnam has invested in such capabilities and sought to integrate them into its asymmetric approach. Yet, significant challenges, including limited combined-arms training, Army-centric command structures, interoperability and doctrinal issues, continue to constrain its efforts to field an effective modern force.