The politics of regional integration in Africa: ECOWAS, SADC, and the uneven enforcement of regional authority

Why do regional organisations condemn unconstitutional rule yet accept settlements that depart from their initial demands? This article compares the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) through the documentary analysis of Madagascar, Niger, Zimbabwe, The Gambia and Guinea between 2008 and January 2025. An agreement that a violation occurred does not settle what must change before pressure can end. Where regional actors recognise a successor and sustain coordinated pressure, bargaining can secure a transfer of power. Where reinstatement is blocked, they may accept elections or relax restrictions while the dispute continues. The comparison distinguishes fulfilment of an original demand, replacement with a different outcome and relaxation without settlement. Ending sanctions cannot serve as a uniform measure of compliance. Regional authority rests on political decisions about acceptable outcomes as well as the application of rules, qualifying the familiar contrast between interventionist ECOWAS and sovereignty-conscious SADC.