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The commercialization of Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS) poses a fundamental challenge to the traditional maritime tort liability system, which centers on human fault. To address this challenge, a three-pronged institutional framework centered on the shipowner, comprising strict liability, liability limitations, and compulsory insurance, should be established. The current fault-based liability system faces structural difficulties due to algorithmic black boxes and shifting liability targets, while the product liability approach and the electronic personhood model also suffer from theoretical flaws. Based on the theories of risk control, risk dispersion, and minimum-cost avoidance, it is justified for shipowners to bear strict liability. Drawing on the model of the 2001 Bunker Convention, a two-tiered liability structure can be established centered on the registered owner, with liability extended in specific circumstances to bareboat charterers, operators, managers, and independent remote operation centers. Shipowners should be granted the right to limit liability similar to that provided under the framework of the 1976 Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, accompanied by compulsory insurance and the victim’s right to bring a direct action, in order to strike a balance between victim redress, fair risk allocation, and sustainable industry development. This composite liability model represents the optimal institutional choice for addressing the challenges posed by MASS torts.
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Lin et al. (2026) studied this question.
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