Varela’s Theory of the Emergent Self Based on a Hegelian–zizekian Subject Model

Autopoietic enactivism views the self as a diachronic identity that arises from repeated bodily, neural and environmental couplings; however, its account leaves a tension between phenomenal and computational selves. This paper explores whether a Hegelian–Zizekian theory of subjectivity can help resolve this contradiction without reintroducing the idea of an essential soul. By reconstructing the concepts of “positing the presuppositions” and “substance is subject” in Hegel, and then comparing them with Varela’s operational closure and embodied coupling through a comparative reading, this article develops the spectral subject as a retrospective, empty point of self-relation. The analysis finds a structural homology in the self-referential loops and accounts for an ungrounded beginning in both theories, but there is a decisive difference in where each places the subject: Varela links it to the organised identity that emerges from the loop, whereas the Hegelian–Zizekian model locates it in the emergent mediation that the loop presupposes and effaces. This distinction reframes the apparent conflict between reduction and autonomy as a relationship between material organisation and a non-substantial mediating function. It also provides a conceptual extension for neurophenomenology: first-person and biological descriptions can be compared at their points of divergence, and psychoanalytic symptom-reading serves as a tentative interpretive model. The proposal clarifies enactive selfhood while maintaining its embodied and non-dualist features.