The Swords of Iron War: evidence, analysis, and lessons

This article examines the defense-related costs of Israel’s 2023-2025 Swords of Iron War, the factors that left Israel insufficiently prepared for such a prolonged, high-intensity, multi-front war, the elements that contributed to the IDF’s military success in the war, and the failure of Israel’s political leadership to translate that success into strategic and diplomatic gains. We document the war’s direct military expenditures and relate deficiencies in personnel, infrastructure, platforms, munitions, and stockpiles to persistent underfunding, short-term budgeting practices, and the absence of a formally approved national security doctrine supported by a consistent long-term defense budget. Using the Swords of Iron War as a case study, we derive broader lessons for defense planning and budgeting under profound strategic uncertainty. Israel’s experience indicates that countries should prepare for extreme security events whose timing, duration, scale, and character cannot be reliably predicted; align political and military objectives with defense planning and resource allocation; and maintain adequate human capital, stockpiles, industrial capacity, flexibility, and, critically, redundancy. Israel’s experience also shows the need for wartime budgeting to adapt rapidly when a conflict becomes substantially longer, larger, or more complex than anticipated.