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Induced institutional change under government policy goals is an important feature of rural land governance in China. This study examines how village clan structure is associated with the adoption of land consolidation before titling in Yangshan County, Guangdong. The theoretical model focuses on negotiations over the redistribution of contracted land rights. It suggests that members of a dominant clan may resist an allocation that threatens their existing land advantages, while their anticipated position after redistribution may shape their willingness to support consolidation. The empirical analysis uses a 2017 survey covering 80 administrative villages, 160 natural villages, and 1,600 households. The reported results associate a larger number of major surnames and more frequent clan gatherings with a higher likelihood of consolidation adoption. Greater unity within the largest-surname group is associated with a lower likelihood of adoption. Exploratory interaction and subgroup results suggest that the negative unity association is weaker at higher levels of baseline land fragmentation. These findings are consistent with a distributional bargaining interpretation, but they do not identify causal effects or directly establish a land-quality mechanism. In particular, unobserved village characteristics and landholdings concentrated within the largest-surname group offer alternative explanations. The study connects informal social organization with negotiated land-policy implementation and highlights the relevance of transparent valuation, inclusive consultation, and compensation for identifiable losses.
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Liu et al. (2026) studied this question.
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