Divine Action in the Human Mind and the Phenomenology of Free Will: Lessons from Augustine

Many theologians and philosophers defend the claim according to which significant human free will is compatible with divine determinism. This article seeks to contribute to the development of theological compatibilism by examining the relationship of agential phenomenology and divine determinism – an issue which is often overlooked in the literature. We are especially interested in how divine deterministic causation is experienced in the process of coming to faith. We draw from Augustine’s letter ep . 2*, where he makes interesting remarks about agential phenomenology and the divine will. The argument is that Augustine’s view opens up significant new options for compatibilists, where the agent might experience her mental actions as her own despite the fact that they are deterministically caused by God. We will begin the article by outlining the basic issues and terms. We will then go on to articulate Augustine’s account of free will and divine will, which we consider compatibilist in nature. Then, we will examine Augustine’s views in ep . 2* and their rhetorical context. Finally, we will consider some objections to Augustine’s account.