Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
Digital procurement systems expand opportunities for public scrutiny. However, their accountability implications depend on how administrative records are linked, interpreted, and used. This study examines the relationship between strengthened procurement-integrity oversight and observable procurement-risk patterns in Canadian federal purchasing. Drawing on public-sector accountability and information-asymmetry perspectives, we conceptualize digital oversight as infrastructure for making procurement decisions auditable. Linked CanadaBuys records support a balanced panel of 96 buying organizations observed over 48 months. Buyer- and month-fixed-effects models evaluate changes associated with the June 2024 oversight shift at Public Services and Procurement Canada, supplemented by comparator sensitivity, sector analyses, and placebo exercises. Baseline estimates indicate lower supplier concentration by award value (−0.119 on a 0–1 scale), lower count-based concentration, and a lower composite integrity-risk index, alongside increased repeated supplier success (+0.040). The negative association with value-based concentration persists across alternative comparison groups, whereas count-based concentration is more sensitive to comparator selection. Placebo and dynamic evidence constrain causal interpretation. We contribute a transparent framework for measuring procurement accountability and show that concentration and supplier recurrence can evolve differently following oversight reform. The findings position digital oversight as a capacity for scrutiny whose effectiveness depends on data quality, professional judgment, and organizational response.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Ufodike et al. (2026) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: