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Indonesia has confined domestic sea transport to national-flag vessels since Presidential Instruction No. 5/2005 and Law No. 17/2008, and the national fleet has expanded markedly since. Whether protection of this kind also entrenches market power in container liner shipping, a segment with high sunk costs and strong scale economies, remains an open empirical question. This article develops an empirical assessment of structure, conduct and performance in Indonesia’s domestic container shipping market. It combines route-level concentration measurement (HHI and concentration ratios) with a New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) system of demand, translog cost and pricing equations that recovers conduct parameters, price–cost markups, scale economies and deadweight loss, and it pairs this design with an institutional analysis of cabotage law and competition enforcement. Published evidence already shows that the four largest carriers’ share of domestic container capacity rose from 67.7% in 2017 to 86.2% in 2019, that route-level HHIs exceed 1,500 on the principal corridors, and that four leading carriers were sanctioned by the competition authority (KPPU) in 2019 for coordinated tariff adjustment on the Surabaya–Ambon route. These facts are consistent with market power but cannot establish it. The article therefore specifies the estimation strategy, identification conditions, decision rules and robustness checks required to test it, and supplies the results template to be populated with carrier–route data. It offers an archipelagic, cabotage-protected counterpart to the deep-sea alliance literature and a testable basis for reconciling fleet sovereignty with competition policy.
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Ariya Primindra (2026) studied this question.
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