Separation of Consequence From Value Justification: Why Establishing a Consequence Does Not Rank the Ends It Affects

This conceptual paper introduces Separation of Consequence From Value Justification, an evaluative criterion for situations in which the same consequence advances one purpose and frustrates another. Establishing what will happen, what causes it, or whether an action succeeds under a chosen purpose does not by itself justify giving that purpose priority. The paper distinguishes evidence about consequences from reasons for ranking competing ends. Facts can strongly inform that ranking, but the evaluative argument must be supplied. Felt importance, welfare, and moral or legal priority may diverge, and support for one does not settle the others. The discussion connects the criterion to Hume’s observation about transitions from is to ought and examines Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill (1978). In the dispute over completing the Tellico Dam and protecting an endangered species, the Court located the governing priority in Congress’s statutory choice. The case identifies a source of legal authority for the ranking without establishing its moral justification or a general rule for competing purposes. Part of the Standards and Answerability series within On Human Modeling, the paper offers questions about whose purposes govern and who can contest their priority. Its framework can inform human–AI research on distinguishing successful performance under a chosen objective from the reasons for prioritizing that objective.