Digital Capability, Information Sharing, and Government Incentives in Electric Vehicle Battery Recycling: Conditions for Stable Cooperation

Extended producer responsibility (EPR) establishes obligations for end-of-life electric vehicle battery recycling, yet stable cooperation depends on stakeholders’ costs and benefits. This study develops a tripartite evolutionary game of automakers, recyclers, and government regulators to examine how digital capability, information sharing, and government incentives shape recycling cooperation. Stability analysis and numerical simulations also examine responsibility-fulfillment costs. All parameters are illustrative and have not been calibrated to industry data. Under the illustrative baseline, the system converges to an equilibrium in which automakers adopt Active Responsibility, recyclers adopt Deep Participation, and regulators adopt Routine Regulation. The adoption proportions for automakers and recyclers reach 0.90 at approximately 15.97 and 21.95 time units, respectively, while regulatory adoption falls below 0.10 at about 8.05. Digital capability raises automakers’ relative payoffs but may slow recyclers’ adjustments through government-strategy feedback. Information sharing directly benefits recyclers and benefits automakers conditional on recycler participation, whereas insufficient sharing may prevent stable cooperation without additional subsidies. Higher responsibility-fulfillment costs slow automakers’ adjustments. Government incentives primarily shape the transition and have asymmetric effects depending on the recipient. Long-run cooperation without additional incentives requires positive net cooperation payoffs for both firms. These findings inform digital capability development, information sharing, and differentiated incentive design.