“Servant of Two Masters!?” – a Critical Analysis of the Role of Football Clubs in the Principal–Agent Relationship Between Footballers and Player Agents

Summary The role of clubs in the relationship between association football players and player agents has received little attention in existing research, even though clubs typically bear the costs of agent remuneration. This study addresses this research gap by examining the role of clubs as well as the challenges and consequences associated with the specific constellation between football players, player agents, and clubs from the perspectives of players and agents. Drawing on principal–agent theory, we conducted semi-structured interviews with Bundesliga players (n = 10) and player agents (n = 12). The findings show that clubs play only a limited role in the initiation of player–agent relationships but exert a more substantial influence after contract conclusion through remuneration structures, transfer negotiations, and direct interactions with agents. Players report limited transparency regarding agreements between clubs and agents, while agents acknowledge their strategically central position and the financial incentives associated with transfers. The results indicate that the constellation is characterized by information asymmetries, limited sanctioning opportunities, and misaligned incentives. Overall, the findings suggest that the player–agent relationship is embedded in a triadic structure in which clubs indirectly shape incentives and information flows.