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We study optimal feedback design when evaluations affect subsequent strategic communication within organizations. A firm designs public feedback about an employee's potential before the employee communicates private information about project-specific circumstances to a manager. While more informative feedback helps the manager make better decisions, it can also intensify preference conflicts and undermine the credibility of subsequent communication. We characterize the optimal feedback policy. First, full disclosure is either optimal for all prior beliefs or strictly suboptimal for all of them. In particular, it is optimal when preference conflicts are sufficiently small or sufficiently large. Second, when full disclosure is suboptimal, no disclosure is optimal for some priors, while partial disclosure is strictly optimal for some priors if and only if the number of messages in equilibrium communication varies with posterior beliefs. Third, optimal partial disclosure can conclusively identify low-potential employees when high potential is rare, but high-potential employees when it is common.
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Kishishita et al. (2026) studied this question.
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