Enhancing Social Well‐Being? A Comparative Analysis of Psychological Egoism and Virtue Ethics as Foundations for Social Psychology Interventions

The disciplinary aim distinguishing applied social psychology from basic social psychology is the use of theory to develop interventions for social and practical problems. However, many applied social psychologists have failed to adequately consider the pre‐investigatory philosophical assumptions about human nature in their theories and the sort of flourishing social life such assumptions actually encourage. The aim of this analysis is to demonstrate why applied social psychologists should more carefully consider the conceptual and practical fit between their (often unexamined) assumptions of psychological egoism and instrumentalism and the kind of thriving social and relational life they intend their interventions to foster. In so doing, we offer a comparative analysis of the vision of social life and flourishing implied by psychological egoism and instrumentalism, particularly as exemplified in the social exchange theory (SET), and an alternative vision grounded in an Aristotelian philosophical anthropology. We argue that the Aristotelian vision of human nature and social life is preferable to the one egoistic and instrumentalist one commonly assumed by many applied social psychologists because it offers a greater possibility of attaining and encouraging the sort of vibrant and flourishing social life that applied social psychologists actually intend to promote.