Threat-induced elite alliances: the breakdown of the AKP–Gülen movement alliance in Turkey

Why do some informal elite alliances in autocratising or authoritarian settings break down through abrupt confrontation rather than gradual disengagement? Using theory-building process tracing of the alliance between Turkey’s Justice and Development Party and the Gülen movement during the period 2002–2016, this article develops the concept of threat-induced elite alliances. It identifies a three-stage mechanism: formation under a shared elite-removal threat, state-embedded consolidation and escalating efforts to disable the partner before losing the capacity to act. The party contributed electoral legitimacy and executive authority, while the movement supplied societal reach through the media and education sectors and informal networks among police officers, judges and prosecutors. As the military and higher judiciary became less capable of removing or excluding either partner, mutual dependence declined and their power bases diverged. Without binding rules governing access to state institutions, each side regarded the other’s capabilities as jeopardising its own political position and organisational survival. Investigations, personnel reassignments, regulatory interventions and securitisation formed a sequence of pre-emptive moves and countermoves. The alliance collapsed with the July 2016 coup attempt. The article shows how autocratisation weakens safeguards for orderly separation, raises the costs of political defeat and intensifies commitment problems within informal, state-embedded alliances.