From Sign to Concept and Belief: A Semiotic-Cognitive Approach Based on Peirce and Dretske

The theoretical problem of how we form and revise our concepts and beliefs has received renewed attention in the contemporary context of digital culture and the exponential advances of artificial intelligence systems. In this paper, we propose an articulation between Fred Dretske's epistemology and Charles S. Peirce's semiotics for the study of the aforementioned theoretical problem. We begin with the premise that signs and information constitute the foundation of our concepts and beliefs. This allows us to identify: 1) how the process of forming conceptual structures and beliefs occurs from an informational base; and 2) how we should revise them in order to achieve knowledge. Our thesis is that the concept of conceptualization in Dretske can be used to comprehend the formation of our beliefs. Additionally, the semiotic relationship under which we must revise our beliefs can be understood through pragmatism and, most importantly, the concept of collateral experience in Peirce. The study concludes that addressing the theoretical issue of concept and belief formation and revision through the articulation between Peirce and Dretske enables us, firstly, to attribute a pragmatic, semiotic-cognitive-executive character to the mechanism by which we construct beliefs from signs, and secondly, to understand that the action of the sign that constitutes our belief systems does indeed depend on the continuity of informational flows, but only if the collaterality acts in such a way as to create a reticular semiosis.