Constitutional Accommodation and the Distribution of Power in South Asia

Constitutional recognition of minorities can coexist with substantial constraints on their ability to influence public decisions or obtain relief. This article examines that relationship through religious classification and representation in Pakistan, secularism and property restitution in Bangladesh, proportional inclusion in Nepal, provincial devolution in Sri Lanka, and educational autonomy in India. It develops a comparative framework that distinguishes the content of a guarantee, the institution controlling its implementation, the availability of review, and the form of relief. The analysis identifies several mechanisms through which accommodation becomes conditional, including nonjusticiable policy commitments, party control over representation, qualified provincial powers, and judicial tests of eligibility. It also identifies counterexamples to the claim that recognition is uniformly unenforceable. Constitutional accommodation emerges as a distribution of decision-making authority whose protective value depends on the relationship between participation, review, and implementation. Reform should address those relationships while preserving the distinct interests protected by each arrangement.