Constitutional Hyper-amendment and the Impact on Constitutional Text

Under the traditional American model of constitutionalism, short and sparsely amended Constitutions were considered a predominant theoretical model. However, recent research has highlighted the emergence of an alternative model of longer, frequently amended Constitutions. Scholarship has begun to examine the effects of higher amendment rates across various domains. This article explores the impact of hyper-amendment on the quality of constitutional text. Through a case study of Mexico and Brazil, two prototypical outliers in rigidity indices with divergent constitutional periods within that dynamic, it argues that hyper-amendment de facto often correlates with lower-quality constitutional text. To identify the above, the article proposes using textual inconsistencies, contradictions, and errors as indicators of a common minimum denominator of drafting mistakes. It then demonstrates the textual deficiencies resulting from the hyper-amendment dynamic in those jurisdictions. The article argues that higher amendment rates, which may lead to a poorer constitutional text, can produce interpretative problems, complicate the constitutional role of crystallizing agreements among political elites, or even foster further remedial amendments. Although textual quality is not the sole determinant in evaluating hyper-amendment dynamics, the article argues that it should be considered a relevant factor when weighing the complex trade-offs of hyper-amendment.