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In the reception history of developmental and evolutionary linguistics, "pre-linguistic" is situated in the past, and adults' ineffable experiences are retroactively interpreted as early remnants, accompanied by a normative ideal of "adequate articulation." This paper argues that the popular presupposition of this ideal—that experience can be fully encoded—does not hold: propositionalization is a selective abstraction, and every abstraction simultaneously produces content it cannot accommodate. This paper terms this layer "constitutive surplus" and divides it into givenness (the condition of propositionalization, which cannot be realized but only acknowledged) and concrete surplus (the omission of each abstraction, which can be taken up and actualized). The surplus is not a blind spot awaiting illumination, but the very condition for the emergence of new meaning. After conceptualization reaches its limits, concrete surplus is realized through two paths that do not rely on propositional information as a medium: bodily co-presence opens up situations intersubjectively, and decisive action changes the position of the surplus through irreversible consequences. Realization does not eliminate the surplus; it only changes the subject's relationship to it, and is a local, reversible respite. The revealing efficacy of action must be separated from moral legitimacy. In this paper, "pre-linguistic" always refers to what is logically prior to propositionalization, i.e., pre-propositional experience, not what is temporally prior to language acquisition.
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光 许 (2026) studied this question.
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