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This conceptual paper introduces Non-Compositionality of Dyadic Relationships, a mechanism in which adding a third person changes attention, alliances, roles, and available alternatives, so that the properties of separate pairwise relationships do not determine the interaction of the group. The account assesses a claim about group compatibility through evidence about the actual group rather than evidence about each pair. Good dyadic relationships establish that the pairs work. They do not establish how attention will be divided, which alliances will form, whether one member will be left out, or how the presence of an alternative partner changes what each person can ask of the others. That the triad is not fixed by its dyads is structural; which dynamics occur is empirical. The discussion connects the mechanism to Caplow’s theory of coalitions in triads and examines Wissink and colleagues’ replication of a three-person bargaining game. In that setting, every pair could satisfy the developer’s requirement, yet the participant with the largest landholding was often excluded from the coalition. The case illustrates how a third member creates alternatives and bargaining relations that do not exist within any isolated pair. Part of the Coordination and Dependence series within On Human Modeling, the paper examines how relationships change when they become part of a larger group, who is left out when alliances form, and who is required to divide loyalty. Its framework can inform human–AI research on multi-agent interaction, team composition, and why successful pairwise relationships do not by themselves establish that a larger human–AI group will coordinate successfully.
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Alexandra Cary (2026) studied this question.
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