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Over the past decade, the rapid expansion of digital platforms has transformed the world economy, but it has also given rise to a fundamental competition policy challenge: why do rapidly growing digital markets tip towards dominance by a small number of platforms? Using evidence from India’s digital economy, this paper examines qualitatively sources of dominance and evaluates whether India’s existing competition framework is apt to address the challenges posed by digital platforms. It argues that platform dominance has emerged from the interaction between structural characteristics and strategic business practices. The paper further demonstrates that the Competition Commission of India has applied competition principles inconsistently, particularly in defining the relevant market and assessing dominance, limiting the effectiveness of ex-post enforcement. Drawing insights from recent developments in the European Union and the United States, the paper argues that India should adopt a hybrid framework combining ex-post antitrust enforcement with targeted ex-ante obligations to preserve market contestability, fairness and innovation.
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PL et al. (2026) studied this question.
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