A Theoretical Model of Legal Presumptions Based on Legal–Philosophical Analysis

This article constructs a theoretical model of legal presumptions on the basis of legal–philosophical analysis. The research addresses the relationship between the possible cognitive genesis of a presumption and the legal authority that permits or requires reliance on it. The proposed model provides common analytical questions for comparing these dimensions, while the operation of each legal presumption depends on its identifiable legal source and context. The central question is how the philosophical–epistemological account of presumption relates to its distinct operation as a legally authorised instrument of provisional reasoning and action. The methodological basis of the research is the instrumental theory of law, within the framework of which presumptions are viewed not only as logical structures but also as instruments of cognition and legal regulation. The ontological and epistemological analysis examines a possible cognitive genesis of presumption through ideas about objects and perceived regularities; however, this account does not itself supply a legal warrant for presumptive treatment. In this respect, presumptions function as a means of cognising reality, possessing not only descriptive but also performative significance. As a result of the research, we conclude that legal presumptions cannot be fully explained solely as technical constructs or as means of proof; rather, they should be understood as devices connecting provisional acceptance with legally authorised consequences for specified actors, subject to identifiable conditions of defeat. The instrumental reconstruction complements existing accounts of defeasible reasoning by specifying this connection, and Armenian statutory examples are used to test its distinction from direct legal rules and interpretive starting points.