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Crypto trading systems can be constrained by message budgets, information delay, prefunded inventory, or competition for execution rights. We price these constraints in explicit models without assuming that any one is universally dominant. Under an average message budget, optimal selection thresholds the conditional expected reward; exponential and Pareto marks give closed-form captured-value shares. A finite-token dynamic program shows why an average-budget threshold need not respect a short enforcement window. Periodic observations of an Ornstein–Uhlenbeck signal impose an information-age discount under a specified decision clock, but do not impose a lower bound on the signal’s half-life. An Erlang loss model describes unselective inventory throughput and its diminishing, strictly positive marginal response to opportunity intensity. More importantly, a one-slot selective-admission model yields an exact optimal threshold and reward rate through the Lambert W function: profit can keep increasing even while trade count approaches its capacity. Finally, an explicitly assumed full-dissipation discovery model separates unilateral compute incentives from symmetric industry rent and admits dependence and partial-dissipation extensions. Reproducible synthetic experiments test these results and their failure cases. Hardware choices remain conditional on measured model quality, end-to-end delays, venue rules, and costs; no live-market profitability or device benchmark is claimed.
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Miquel Noguer Alonso (2026) studied this question.
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