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Purpose : Practical quantum key distribution (QKD) deployments remain constrainedby finite-key effects, hardware noise, and limited adversarial attackmodeling. This work aims to close the gap between theoretical composable securityguarantees and realistic hardware performance by developing noise-resilient,multi-basis QKD protocols with provable finite-key security bounds. Methods : A generalized multi-basis BB84 protocol (MB-BB84) and a phaseengineeredE91 entanglement-based scheme (PE-E91) are developed with composablesecurity guarantees under depolarizing and amplitude-damping noisechannels. Finite-key security bounds are derived using the smooth min-entropyframework. Zero-noise extrapolation (ZNE) error mitigation is integrated intothe composable security analysis. Experimental validation is performed usinghardware-calibrated noise models derived from superconducting quantum processors. Results : The 3-basis MB-BB84 achieves a composable finite-key rate 7.4%higher than standard BB84 at a block size of one million signals, while increasingintercept-resend eavesdropper detection probability from 75.0% to 83.3%.PE-E91 improves the CHSH Bell parameter by 4.2% over standard E91. ZNE mitigationextends the practical security threshold by 30–40% in terms of maximumtolerable gate error rate on superconducting hardware. All analytical predictionsare confirmed within 3–5% of semidefinite-programming-computed key ratebounds. Conclusion : The proposed unified framework bridges theoretical composablesecurity and practical hardware constraints, providing explicit design guidelinesfor scalable, noise-resilient QKD architectures suitable for next-generationquantum communication networks.
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Ayyavaraiah et al. (2026) studied this question.