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This article develops the concept of manipulative injustice to identify a normative vulnerability in legal argument schemes. Dialectical models of legal argumentation do not themselves prescribe the allocation of burdens found in particular legal doctrines, nor are they incapable of representing strategic or bad-faith speech. However, even dialectical legal argument schemes may be vulnerable to asymmetrical burdens of proof with inadequate mechanisms for addressing pretext, evasion, and bad faith. The article develops this claim through the treatment of pretext and bad faith, focusing on the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework and the “Pretext Plus” approach associated with St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks . This comparison reveals an important distinction between the dialectical defeat of an explanation and the legal sufficiency of a claim. I argue that manipulative injustice can arise when asymmetrical burdens of proof converge with inadequate inferential mechanisms for evaluating objective and circumstantial evidence of concealed motive. The article identifies three dimensions for evaluating such schemes: evidence conditions, specifying what evidence supports an inference of pretext or bad faith; defeat conditions, specifying when such evidence defeats a proffered explanation; and consequence conditions, specifying what legal significance follows from that defeat. Manipulative injustice thus provides a diagnostic framework for evaluating when legally instantiated argument schemes become vulnerable to strategic manipulation.
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Kevin Scott Jobe (2026) studied this question.
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