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This article examines whether Asian economies grew rich because of market liberalization or through sequenced combinations of private incentives, state capacity, structural transformation, and external support. A historical legislative and policy ledger documents 45 events in 18 Asian economies, while the harmonized data comprise 45,407 country-year records drawn fromMaddison, Penn World Table, World Development Indicators, institutional indexes, and other uploaded datasets. The principal strategy triangulates legal event timing, long-run income counterfactuals, within-country modern institutional variation, heterogeneity interactions, and falsification tests rather than imposing one time-invariant definition of economic freedom. Theanalysis combines capital–labor–productivity growth accounting, convergence regressions and log-t screening, endogenous multiple-break and unit-root diagnostics, historical country- and time-weighted counterfactuals, staggered-cohort comparisons with not-yet-treated Asian cases, actual applied-tariff measurements, positive and negative index movements, commodity-priceinteractions, aid-flow shocks, crisis interactions, and outlier-robust tariff placebo tests. Penn World Table yields 825 complete annual national-accounting decompositions; WDI provides 3,806 tariff-rate and 10,203 official-development-assistance observations in the harmonized panel. Twelve policy episodes admit weighted counterfactual comparisons, while additional country-held-out orthogonal machine-learning estimates and threshold diagnostics expose learner sensitivity and poor overlap. The tariff-growth association for Asia is particularly fragile: its initially negative and significant coefficient changes sign and loses significance when extreme annual tariff changes or Nepal are excluded, and a negative-control regression associates tariff movements with earlier growth. The Asian cross-sectional convergence slope changes sign between 1960–1990 and 1990–2020, while full-sample transition-convergence tests reject homogeneity. Strong growth around reform episodes therefore cannot be uniquely attributed to market opening. Documented pretrends, policy bundling, endogenous dates, donor contamination and measurement problems prevent a single reliable causal estimate of “free markets.” The evidence is consistent with heterogeneous, sequenced market–state complementarities but does not identify their separate causal contributions.
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RICARDO ALONZO FERNANDEZ SALGUERO (2026) studied this question.
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